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Abstract 
 
Recent changes in U.S. energy policy have prompted the growth of the bio energy market. The 
ability to quickly enter and respond to the opportunities of this market is critical to an 
agribusiness’ success. Understanding entry into this rapidly growing bio energy market, 
however, is not well understood. In drawing on management theories of the Resource Based 
View (RBV) and that of Organizational Ecology, this study develops a conceptual and dynamic 
programming model to explain the entry behaviors of different types of bio energy businesses.  A 
contribution of this study is it demonstrates that bio energy entry decisions emphasize a basic 
trade-off involving gains from a commitment to specialized, and correspondingly higher cost 
assets, and gains from remaining flexible with lower levels of fixed and less specific assets. This 
commitment-flexibility trade-off not only underlies entry, but such a trade-off is argued to be 
influenced by the population and uncertain conditions of the market.  Importantly our work also 
sheds light on the implicit risks of the ethanol industry, and in part explains how corn-based dry 
mills and cellulosic-ethanol conversion technologies may be ideal depending on the type of 
market conditions upon entry. 
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Introduction 
 
Through various considerations relating to the U.S. Clean Air Act, rising energy prices, 
increasing green house gas emissions, and heightened concerns for national security, U.S. energy 
policy has focused its efforts on reducing its energy dependence from foreign supplies. Such a 
policy environment has contributed to a significant growth in the U.S. production of ethanol 
from 175 million gallons in 1980 to 4.85 billion gallons in 2006 (Rendleman and Shapouri, 
2007); (Renewable Fuels Association 2008). Furthermore, five year forecasts made in 2007 
predicted ethanol supply to exceed 7.5 billion gallons before 2012 (Mosier 2007). These 
estimates are already dated as U.S. supply has already breached 10 billion gallons in 2009 and is 
expected to rise substantially if the gasoline blend level is increased by 50% (RFA 2010). These 
market conditions have subsequently attracted the entry of many agri- and bio-related businesses. 
Ethanol plants alone have increased from 50 in 1999 to 170 in 2009 (Renewable Fuels 
Association 2009).  
 
With this increasing growth and entry into the ethanol market, a basic challenge facing managers 
and investors is knowing when and how to enter this dynamic sector. On the question of when, 
earlier entrants into ethanol processing had gained significant first mover advantages from not 
only more favorable processing margins, but it also yielded pre-emptory benefits of lower 
construction and facility operation costs (Hurt, et al. 2006). While, later entrants face higher corn 
prices, higher construction costs, and, in particular, uncertainty about policy commitments to bio 
fuels. For instance, U.S. policy makers have questioned the use of corn for fuel and have 
contemplated the importation of lower cost sugarcane-based ethanol from Brazil.  Enacted policy 
could thereby undermine the continued profitability of the corn-based ethanol market; causing 
pause for entry into the industry.   
 
The emergence of alternative ethanol technologies also complicates the business environment for 
bio fuels. For example, there may be second mover advantages for firms to enter directly into 
second generation technologies, such as cellulosic.  Relative to corn dry milling, cellulosic 
models are viewed as a more environmental friendly technology. They use a feedstock that does 
not directly compete for food production, has the potential to yield more ethanol per acre, and is 
thought to have a more favorable carbon footprint.  
 
As the industry deals with the issue of when and how to enter the ethanol sector, management 
theories offer insights into this entry problem. One theory of management is the Resource Based 
View (RBV). It finds specialized assets create an incentive to enter early (King and Tucci 2002); 
(Mitchell 1989, 1991). This is because although specialized assets can yield a firm a differential 
or efficiency advantage over rivals (Lee et al., 2000; (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998); (Mitchell 
1989, 1991), the returns from such specialized are “eventually” imitated or replicated by new 
entrants (Lee et al., 2000); (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998); (Mitchell 1989, 1991), Hence, 
specialized assets create an incentive to enter so as to gain first move advantage in securing the 
value of such assets (King and Tucci, 2001); (Mitchell, 1989,1991). For instance, empirical 
studies have found early entry can increase with the presence of specialized assets, such as in the 
U.S. Medical Diagnostic Imaging Industry (e.g., Mitchell, 1989, 1991). We explore in this 
research how this line of RBV reasoning although useful to understanding other industries, may 
not be applicable to the case of ethanol.   This is because new entrants that produce corn-based 
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ethanol by in large do not employ specialized assets, while the later entrants employing second 
generation cellulosic technologies do. This is because amongst other factors involving logistics, 
pretreatment activities etc, cellulose conversion to fermentable sugars is significantly more 
complex, and requires substantial R&D investments, either directly or indirectly, in specialized 
enzymes not used for corn or sugarcane. 
 
Alternatively, theory from Organizational Ecology holds more promise to explaining the bio 
energy entry problem. Critics have maintained, and we find as well, that the firm level focus of 
the RBV leads to insufficient attention to the conditions of the market (e.g., Priem and Butler 
2001).  Organizational Ecology holds that in order to remain nimble and adaptive, the 
uncertainties associated with the emergence of new industries, bio energy in our case, require 
firms to not over invest in specialized assets. Such uncertainties however evolve with industry 
development and therefore different firm typologies are required to compete and survive at 
different stages of industry growth.  We explore this theory and juxtapose it with the RBV within 
a dynamic simulation model of business entry and survival within the bio energy sector.  
 
The objective of this study is to thereby integrate the specialized asset arguments of the RBV 
with the typologies and market level focus of Organizational Ecology. Through this integration, 
this study introduces a conceptual and analytical model that helps managers, investors, and 
analysts assess the entry decisions, especially as it relates to the dry milling and cellulosic 
conversion technologies of the ethanol market. This application to the bio energy sector also 
provides a novel context to advance the theoretical integration of RBV and Organizational 
Ecology perspectives to understanding a firm’s entry decisions. Specifically, in this conceptual 
model, our contribution is that we demonstrate a bio energy firm’s entry decisions depend on a 
basic trade-off between gains from a commitment to specialized, and correspondingly higher 
cost assets and gains from remaining flexible with lower levels of fixed and less specific assets. 
This commitment-flexibility trade-off not only underlies entry, but such a trade-off is argued to 
be influenced by the population and uncertain conditions of the market. Importantly our work 
also sheds light on the implicit risks of the ethanol industry, and in part explains how corn-based 
dry mills and cellulosic-ethanol conversion technologies may be ideal depending on the type of 
market conditions upon entry. To explore the implications of this basic trade-off for both 
managers and investors, a dynamic programming (DP) model is constructed that jointly accounts 
for this flexibility-commitment tradeoff and the market dynamics of the ethanol market.  
 
In the development of this study’s theoretical and simulation model, it is important to recognize 
that such a model is based on the authors’ “best knowledge to date” of the ethanol industry. In 
particular, as the ethanol industry is a relatively young industry, much remains unknown and 
further analysis is needed as better information is developed. Hence, as understanding of this 
industry develops, our assumptions of this model will likely change and thus would need to re-
evaluate the conclusions of our model (e.g. McGrath and MacMillan 2000). Our observations of 
this industry and the subsequent assumptions used in the development of our model thereby 
reflect but one possible view of the ethanol industry. Nevertheless, in spite of the changing and 
highly uncertain nature of this industry, we believe our study offers an “experimental” approach 
– a novel theoretical and simulation approach- that can help better understand some of the key 
risks factors impacting bio energy entry. Such an approach follows a “disciplined 
entrepreneurship” approach ascribed by Sull (2004) in which reduction of uncertainty can arise 
from not only the “experimentation of something new” but in doing so help identify the key 
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variables that influence their possible payoffs (see also McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). The 
study’s theoretical and empirical model is developed with this spirit in mind in which the 
integration of the RBV and Organizational Ecology perspectives into a DP context not only 
offers a unique approach to understanding ethanol entry decisions, but in doing so identify new 
variables of interest for manager and investors to consider when evaluating their bio-energy 
firm’s possible payoffs.   
 
Conceptual Model 
 
Model Assumptions and Entry Characteristics of the Ethanol Industry 
 
Some key assumptions and definitions are thereby first outlined before reviewing the associated 
literature. As the focus of this study is on the firm’s entry into the ethanol market, this study 
assumes that the bio energy firm only produces ethanol fuel. This study’s setting is stylized as 
we assume first generation ethanol conversion technologies only involve dry milling and second 
generation technologies involve cellulosic. Although there are numerous other possible forms of 
bio-conversion technologies, such as algae, entry into the ethanol market has been largely fueled 
by debates between these two technologies (e.g. McAloon et al. 2000); (Mosier 2007); 
(Robertson et al. 2000). Furthermore, this study does not examine wet milling technologies. Wet 
milling technologies can be used to process corn into ethanol as well as many other non ethanol 
products, such as high fructose corn syrup, corn oil, lysine, corn meal, plastics, and dyes. This 
study focuses only on dry milling technologies because relative to wet milling, it remains as the 
dominant ethanol conversion technology for new entrants due to its lower capital costs (Dale and 
Tyner 2006). Given these assumption, we examine the entry arguments underlying the RBV and 
Organizational ecology.   
 
A basic assertion of the RBV is that a firm’s performance or profitability stems from the 
characteristics of its resources. In terms of dynamic entry decisions, specialized assets are of 
particular interest to the RBV. The RBV argues that since specialized assets promote efficiency, 
specialized assets offer a firm a differential or efficiency advantage over rivals (Lee et al., 2000; 
(Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998); (Mitchell 1989, 1991). However, as specialized assets can 
“eventually” be imitated or replicated by new entrants (Lee et al., 2000); (Ghemawat and Del Sol 
1998); (Mitchell 1989, 1991), specialized assets create an incentive to enter early because early 
entry enables a firm to gain a “head start” in securing the value of such assets (King and Tucci 
2002); Mitchell, 1989, 1991). In the context of the ethanol market and as argued further, this 
RBV explanation suggests firms with specialized assets, such as cellulosic, should enter quickly.  
Waiting exposes the underlying technology to competitive imitation and thus eroding the 
economic rents associated with the investments in the specialized technology (i.e. development 
of feedstock specific cellulosic enzymes). This also suggests that firms with less specific or 
flexible assets, such as dry milling, do not face such risks from entering early.  
 
This RBV logic, however, does not fit well with the market entry of first generation dry mill 
technologies.  Entry into ethanol in the late 1990s was broad and rapid with few technological 
barriers to entry (Renewable Fuels Association 2004). As dry mill technologies were not 
specific, but available to all, the lower capital requirements of this non-specialized technology 
allowed for easy entry. This ease of entry subsequently led to a rapid increase in production 
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capacity. While, as the second-generation technology, cellulosic involves significantly more 
specialized and as a result higher cost assets, cellulosic models have been adopted at a much 
slower pace.  Hence, although the RBV provides some direction for explaining firm entry, the 
specific technology entry argument appears inconsistent or incomplete for explaining this pattern 
of entry in the U.S. ethanol industry.  
 
Such inconsistencies can be attributed to limitations of the RBV. As the RBV has been criticized 
for its lack of attention to market conditions (Priem and Butler, 2001), entry timing research has 
called for a greater integration of the logic of the RBV with Organizational Ecology (Lieberman 
and Montgomery 1998). This is because Organizational Ecology argues that market conditions 
not only have a decisive influence on the entry and survival of firms, but also different stages of 
market development can have a distinct influence on the survival of different types of firms. For 
instance, during the early stages of market development, the market is commonly characterized 
by a high level of uncertainty and a low degree of competition (Lambkin and Day 1989).  During 
this stage, Organizational Ecology argues that the market favors the entry and survival of flexible 
businesses because these firms, termed as R types, are suited to capitalizing on the emerging 
opportunities of early market development (Lambkin and Day 1989). Yet, as markets mature 
with greater certainty and competition, these market conditions favor the entry and survival of 
more efficient businesses characterized by K types. As a result, a shortcoming of RBV 
explanations is that entry decisions are not only influenced by a firm’s specialized assets, but can 
also be influenced by the typologies and market conditions described by Organizational Ecology. 
However, absent in Organizational Ecology theory is it fails to provide sufficient attention to the 
specialized assets ascribed by the RBV. Hence, in order to develop an integrated RBV and 
Organizational ecology model of bio energy firm entry, the nature of a bio energy firm’s 
specialized assets is explained in the context of the market conditions ascribed by Organizational 
Ecology.  
   
Resource Based View Perspective on Entry Order: Specialized Assets 
 
To advance this development, specialized assets are defined by a commitment to a course of 
action that is costly to reverse (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998: 28). In other words, specialized 
assets involve significant investments upon entry and thus involve a high cost of abandonment 
(Ghemawat and Del. Sol 1998). In a bio energy context, dry milling firms generally face a lower 
commitment of resources and are associated with a lower degree of asset specificity than 
cellulosic.  For instance, the capital cost for a typical dry mill ethanol plant is about $1 per gallon 
of capacity while cellulosic ethanol has capital costs 400 times greater (Renewable Fuels 
Association 2004); (McDermott 2009). While, more conservative estimates have found that 
second generation cellulosic production of ethanol from wood chips would still require $5 of 
capital per gallon of ethanol capacity (Mascoma Corp. 2008).  Such differences in cost structure 
stem from bio-chemical reasons because dry milling technologies that convert starch are 
significantly simpler than those converting cellulose. While, cellulose conversion to fermentable 
sugars is significantly more complex, and requires substantial R&D investments, either directly 
or indirectly, in specialized enzymes not used for corn or sugarcane. Furthermore, dry milling 
technologies also have a long history producing industrial and food grade alcohols which has 
benefitted from learning curve and scale related cost efficiencies. While cellulosic is a second 
generation technology and has yet to be fully commercialized and thus does not benefit from the 
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specialized efficiencies of dry milling. Lastly, as corn is the primary feedstock for dry milling, 
the transportation and storage of corn can be supported by existing assets of the market.  On the 
other hand the primary feedstock for cellulosic plants, agricultural, industrial, and municipal 
wastes require novel collection logistic, storage, and pre-processing configurations and specific 
investments (Goldsmith et al. 2009). In fact, collection logistic, storage and pre-processing 
treatments tend to designed for the specific feedstock being used. For instance, due to the greater 
composition of liquids in municipal waste, the transportation of municipal waste requires 
different logistics, handling and pre-treatments than that of wood chips. As a result of these 
factors, the dry miller faces lower entry and abandonment costs due to a lower degree of asset 
specialization. 
 
This concept of specialized assets not only underscores differences in commitment between that 
of the dry millers and cellulosic, but the concept also exhibits heterogeneous and imperfectly 
immobile properties that can impact a firm’s entry decision. Specialized assets are heterogeneous 
resources in so far as they provide an efficiency differential between the firm and that of its 
rivals (Isobe et al. 2000); (Peteraf 1993); (Wernerfelt 1984). Hence, although specialized assets 
may require greater investment, they are a source of competitive advantage (Ghemawat and Del 
Sol 1998); (Peteraf 1993). For instance, though cellulosic faces higher capital requirements and 
fixed costs, there may be economies not present in dry milling.   For example, cellulosic’s 
reliance on agricultural, forestry, or municipal solid waste – as a primary feedstock- would result 
in lower feedstock costs than dry millers (Lin and Tanaka 2006). Such cost advantages are 
important as feedstock costs are more than 60% of operating expenses.   
 
Finally RBV argues that firms with specialized assets should enter earlier, not later as in the case 
of cellulosic models.  Early entry promotes learning curve effects that reinforce the efficiencies 
of a firm’s specialized assets (Carow et al. 2004); (King and Tucci 2002); (Lee et al. 2000); 
(Lieberman and Montgomery 1998); (Mitchell 1989).  Competitive advantages from learning are 
much less or nonexistent with old technologies such as sugar and starch conversion because 
much of the dry milling technology has been readily available over the past half of the century. .  
While, since cellulosic is yet to be a fully commercialized technology, early entrant cellulose 
plant managers could gain significant advantages over competitors from “learning-by-doing.”   
 
Entry decisions also need to consider that specialized assets are imperfectly immobile 
(Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998), (Peteraf 1993).  Imperfectly immobile assets are assets that are 
specific to the needs of the firm and thus tend to be “sticky” resources (Ghemawat and Del Sol 
1998). For instance, because cellulosic requires a considerable commitment of resources that can 
lead to a potentially high abandonment cost, cellulosic involves high levels of immobile assets. 
Although this immobility preserves a firm’s efficiency differential and thus competitive rents, 
markets can nevertheless shifts and thus render immobile assets useless (Ghemawat and Del Sol 
1998). Furthermore, because immobile assets are “imperfect”, they can “eventually” be imitated 
or replicated by later entrants (Mitchell, 1989, 1991); (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998); (Lee et al. 
2000). With imperfectly immobile assets, there is, therefore, an incentive to enter early. 
 
Due to the heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile properties, specialized assets create an inherent 
tension for managers and investors.  The first mover advantages of entering early to stay ahead 
of imitation and exploit gains from specialization come at a risk to the underlying investment in 
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the specialized assets. This because early and specialized investment in large scale facilities may 
be misplaced as market conditions change. In that, this line of reasoning suggests cellulosic 
firms, such as Mascoma, Iogen, CERES, Novozymes and Genecor International, have an 
incentive to enter early because early entry pre-empts the influences of competitive imitation and 
provides a means to exploit the temporary cost advantages of their firm’s specific assets.  But 
they can be rightly hesitant to such early mover advantages, if the market and policy 
environments for ethanol are too uncertain. For example the U.S. government could chose not to 
protect the higher cost infant cellulose-based ethanol industry in favor of free market policies 
that would allow entry to low cost first generation sugarcane ethanol from Brazil or Cuba. The 
biodiesel industry directly faces such uncertainties as extension of government subsidization has 
recently been allowed to lapse (Abuelsamid 2010).   
 
While, in contrast to specialized resources, non-specialized or flexible resources are neither 
heterogeneous nor imperfectly immobile. Flexible resources, such as dry milling, are not a 
source of competitive advantage (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). This is because non-specialized 
assets do not involve significant commitments in which earlier decisions can be reversed with 
minimal cost (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). Flexible assets thereby not only reduce the cost of 
entry and exit into a market, but as consequence create highly competitive or contestable market 
conditions that erodes gains from such assets (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). As Ghemawat and 
Del Sol (1998) describes: 
 
“Thus, while companies may invest in firm-flexible resources to reduce their exit barriers [i.e. 
low abandonment costs], the trouble is that this kind of investment is also likely to reduce entry 
barriers. In a hypothetical situation where there are no entry or exit barriers – a situation 
described by economists as perfectly contestable – any advantage would be ironed out in the 
twinkling of an eye” (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998: 32) 
 
With flexible assets, there is an incentive to delay entry. This is because, due to the mobile nature 
of non-specific assets, the returns from these assets can be readily appropriated by a firm’s rivals 
(Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). As a result, unlike that of the specialized asset case, early entry 
would not enable the firm to secure the value of these flexible assets and thus favoring later 
entry. Yet, since entry into the bio energy industry is predominantly driven by the early entry of 
dry milling firms, such a RBV explanation thereby cannot readily explain this type of entry 
behavior.  
 
Organizational Ecology Explanations of Entry Order Effects: R and K type Firms  
 
Entry timing decisions are not only influenced by a firm’s specialized or flexibility assets, but are 
also influenced by market conditions surrounding entry. In particular, a basic premise of 
Organizational Ecology is that the market is the primary determinant of a firm’s life cycle. 
Organizational Ecology argues that markets support the entry and thus growth and survival of a 
population of firms (Carroll and Hannan, 1989); (Hannan and Freeman 1977). For instance, in 
the case of ethanol, the growth in the number of ethanol plants is attributed to the market 
opportunities created by the Toxic Substances control act of 2000. The act called for the 
elimination of MTBE additives in fuel because of its potential risks to public health and the 
environment. The act created a standard of utilizing ethanol as a fuel additive replacement. 
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Consequently through this act, a large market for ethanol was created. The creation of this 
market subsequently supported the rapid entry and growth of ethanol processors.  
As markets support the growth of a population of firms, Organization Ecology also argues that 
this growth yields competitive influences that favor the survival of distinct organizational forms 
(Brittain and Freeman 1980); (Brittain and Wholey 1988); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Zammuto 
1988). Organizational Ecology argues that as markets evolve through various stages of the 
product-life cycle, each stage favors the entry and survival of two archetype firms - R and K 
types. R types are characterized by small and flexible entrepreneurial firms that have simple 
organizational structures (i.e. less developed bureaucracies) (Ebben and Johnson 2005); 
(Zammuto 1988). These characteristics enable the R type to quickly capitalize on the newfound 
opportunities of an emerging market niche (Brittain and Freeman1980); (Lambkin and Day 
1989) and thus the R type is proficient in exploiting first mover advantages (FMA) (Brittain and 
Freeman 1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Zammuto 1988). That is, due to R types’ speed and 
flexibility, R types favor early entry into the initial or formative stages of the product-market life 
cycle (Brittain and Freeman 1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Wholey and Brittain 1986); 
(Zammuto 1988). 
 
However, gains from FMA dissipate with the increasing maturity of the product-market lifecycle 
(Lambkin and Day 1989); (Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). With increasing market maturity, 
selection no longer favors the speed and flexibility of R types, but rather favors K types that 
compete on scale efficiencies (Brittain and Freeman 1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989). Such 
efficiencies stem from K types’ types higher fixed investments (i.e. scale economies) and 
bureaucratic organizational structures (Brittain and Freeman 1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989); 
(Zammuto 1988). As these efficiencies enable the K type to compete in highly populated 
markets, K types favor entry into the mature stage of the product-life cycle (Brittain and Freeman 
1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Zammuto 1988).  
 
Integrating the Resource Based View and Organizational Ecology 
 
However, as Organizational Ecology focuses on a population level of analysis, it tends to 
overlook the underlying assets that contribute to R and K types’ entry behavior (see Hannan and 
Freeman 1977). Our study argues that due to R types’ smaller size, the R type lacks specialized 
assets. This is because with its smaller size, the R type does not have the same access to financial 
resources as larger firms and, as a result, lacks the commitment that is necessary for investing 
into fixed and specialized assets (Ebben and Johnson 2005). Yet in spite of this lack of 
specialized assets, the R type firm can shift tactics and goals as environmental circumstances 
change and thus can better respond to new and emerging market opportunities. This is consistent 
with Miles et al. (1978) and Zammuto (1988) who contend R type’s flexibility stems from 
minimizing their long-term commitment to any single technology or market.  
 
However, unlike the R type, the K type exhibits considerably greater specialization of assets. 
This is because with its larger size and more certain business environment, the K type can attract 
larger amounts of financial resources which enable the K type to invest in fixed and dedicated 
production assets. With such investments, the K type benefits from scale efficiencies and other 
related learning economies that serve to further K type’s specialization of tasks (e.g. Brittain and 
Freeman 1980); (Ebben and Johnson 2005); (Miles et al. 1978); (Zammuto 1988). This is 
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consistent with Miles et al. (1978) who find that K type’s efficiencies stems from its 
specialization to a single core technology. However, as specialized assets are costly to reverse 
(Ghemawat and del Sol. 1998), this specialization limits K type’s flexibility to adapt to changing 
market conditions (e.g. Brittain and Freeman 1980); (Zammuto 1988).  
 
In a bio energy context, differences in the R and K types’ specialization of assets are thus argued 
to be analogous to the assets used by the dry mill and cellulosic firms. Namely, the flexibility of 
R types is argued to be analogous to the versatility of the dry milling firm. This is because since 
dry mill firms do not require a significant commitment of resources, dry mill firms face a lower 
entry / exit costs than the cellulosic firm. With these lower costs, the dry milling firm, like the R 
type firm, can thereby quickly respond to the emerging opportunities of the market. This is 
because due to the relative absence of a significant commitment of resources, it minimizes the 
cost of reversing earlier decisions and thus enables the R type firm to respond quickly to changes 
in the market (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). However, since such flexibility is gained at the 
expense of a lack of specialization, the dry milling firm – like the R type- cannot compete on low 
cost. Costs are higher but entry is quicker and easier, and abandonment costs are lower if markets 
change. With such lower abandonment costs, the dry milling firm can thereby exhibit the flexible 
properties of the R type firm. 
 
While, unlike the flexibility of the R type dry milling firm, the efficiencies of the K type are 
analogous to the specializations of the cellulosic firm. Namely, as cellulosic requires significant 
commitments in R&D (Lamonica 2008); (Verenium Corp. 2010) that can span over multiple 
years, such investments are not only costly, but are also costly to reverse.  This commitment to 
R&D though not only gives rise to the specialized nature of the cellulosic firm but such 
commitment raises costs and limits the cellulosic firm’s flexibility to the changing conditions of 
the ethanol market. Therefore, due to this specialization of assets, the cellulosic firm exhibits the 
limited flexibility of the K type. However, as a commitment to specialized assets yields gains in 
efficiency, the cellulosic firm exhibits the scale efficiencies of the K type. For instance, key 
commercial challenges facing cellulosic firms are improving the efficiency of plant operations; 
gallons ethanol/ton of feedstock, enzymes/gallon of ethanol; ethanol/unit of time; and ethanol/ 
unit of capital cellulose (Knauf and Moniruzzaman 2004); (Rendleman and Shapouri 2007); 
(Goldsmith 2009) and(Goldsmith et al. 2010). As these costs largely stem from the firm’s 
commitment to, or acquisition of R&D, such fixed investments can yield opportunities to exploit 
significant scale related economies. For example, investment in efficient enzyme technologies 
would yield access to new large, abundant, and low cost biomass feedstocks. In particular, dry 
milling technologies have a predicted maximum capacity of 15 billion gallons / year due to 
limited corn availability.  Cellulose mills could produce upwards of 70 billion gallons of ethanol 
just from agricultural wastes (Mosier 2007); (Grainnet 2010). This potential to access a larger 
volume of cheap feedstock by the K type cellulose mills can thereby yield scale efficiencies that 
lower the cost of processing ethanol as compared with the R type dry milling approach (Graf and 
Koehler 2000); (Hammelinck et al. 2005). Some studies have suggested that once cellulosic 
enzymes become successfully commercialized, cellulose mills will have significantly lower 
operating costs when compared with dry milling (Lin and Tanaka 2006). Hence, due to the 
specialized nature of the cellulosic, the cellulosic firm is thereby analogous to the large scale 
efficiencies of the K type firm.   
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Based on these R and K type distinctions, Table 1 summarizes the essential features of the R and 
K type bio energy firms and relates their features to differences in their specialized assets. 
 
Table 1. R and K type Bio Energy Firm Characteristics 
Firm Type Flexibility Productive 
Efficiency 
Specialized Assets Bio Energy Firm 
Equivalent 
R Type High High Low Dry Miller 
K Type Low High High Cellulosic 
 
Theoretical Propositions 
 
Specialized Assets and Density Dependence 
 
Differences in the specialization of assets between the R type dry milling and K type cellulosic 
firm not only provide Organizational Ecology a greater firm level orientation, but also yield a 
RBV explanation that is consistent with Organizational Ecology’s theory of density dependence. 
Density dependence suggests that under low density environments, there is an abundance of 
market opportunities that favor the flexibility and speed of the R type dry milling firm. Such a 
view might partially explain the early and rapid entry of dry milling firms during the 1990s. 
During this period, early entry was motivated by a lack of investments in specialized assets 
because this provided the dry milling firm the flexibility to quickly enter and exploit the 
opportunities of the emerging ethanol market. As this early entry into the ethanol market has 
been largely dominated by dry milling technologies (Renewable Fuels Association 2004); (Dale 
and Tyner  2006), this density dependent selection of the R type firm is offered as one 
explanation of the early entry of the dry milling firm.  
 
Alternatively, under highly dense populations, density dependence argues the competition for 
scarce market opportunities favors firms that can compete on efficiency (Brittain and Freeman 
1980); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Zammuto 1988). Since K types have specialized assets that 
yields scale economies, such assets thereby enable the K type to compete in highly competitive 
conditions. Hence, according to density dependence, competitive conditions will favor the entry 
of the K type cellulosic firm. In drawing on the logic of density dependence, the R type dry 
milling firm and K type cellulosic entry behaviors can, thereby, be explained by the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition (1):  Given differences in their specialization of assets, an R and K types’ entry 
timing is density dependent whereby low (high) population densities at founding favor R type 
dry milling firm (K type cellulosic firm) type entrance.   
 
Asset Specificity and Market Uncertainty 
 
In addition to such density dependent effects, Organizational Ecologists contend uncertainties 
over the various stages of the product-market life cycle can also affect an R and K types’ entry 
timing. During the early stages of the product life cycle, consumer preferences are typically ill 
defined and product attributes such as price, quality, function and other demand attributes are 
largely unknown (Kerin et al. 1992); (Lambkin and Day 1989); (Shankar et al. 1998). With such 
uncertainty, the R type’s lack of specialized assets minimizes their exposure to risk because by 
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avoiding a significant commitment of resources, changes in market conditions incur a minimal 
cost to R type’s investments (Ghemawat and Del Sol, 1998). In addition, since R types lack of 
specialized assets result in a smaller scale of operations, R types are better able to with stand 
down turns during the early stages of market development. However, as markets mature, the 
greater certainty of market favors the selection of the K type firm (Lambkin and Day1989); 
(Zammuto 1988). With greater market certainty, customer needs become better identified to 
which allows marketing efforts to be precisely targeted. Input requirements also become better 
defined. Hence, as markets mature, markets favor K types’ specializations of skills (Lambkin and 
Day 1989); (Robinson et al. 1992). Moreover, the K type is favored in certain markets because 
the reduction of market uncertainty minimizes the risk to K type’s specialized assets to which 
enables the K type to focus on developing further improvements in their production efficiencies 
(Lambkin and Day 1989). With this reduction of market uncertainty, this promotes the entry by 
the K type firm. 
 
Such “uncertainty” dependent predictions have parallels to the uncertainties faced by bio energy 
firms. There are various sources of uncertainty that can impact the demand for ethanol. 
Currently, the demand for ethanol is limited by an “ethanol-blend wall” in which a maximum of 
a 10% ethanol-fuel blend is permitted for transportation fuels. However Growth Energy has 
recently proposed to the EPA raising the amount to 15%. Such potential changes in fuel blend 
mixture are therefore one important sources of demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainties can 
also arise from the threat of low cost exporters of ethanol, such as Brazil. Furthermore, there 
have been increasing concerns by critics about the social and environmental benefits of corn-
ethanol production (Roberts et al. 2000). Critics have argued that the production of fuel from 
corn directly competes with human consumption. Furthermore, the increasing use of chemicals 
and fertilizers in the production of corn-ethanol has led to increasing skepticism about the 
environment benefits of corn-ethanol (Roberts et al. 2000). Such debates create considerable 
uncertainty about the continued viability and thus demand for the US corn-ethanol industry. Such 
demand uncertainties also places considerable uncertainty in the underlying technologies that 
will define this market. Namely, will the market by defined by cellulosic or by dry milling 
technology?  
 
Under such uncertain demand conditions, Organizational Ecology suggests that the R type dry 
milling firm is better able to tolerate the uncertainties of this market. This is because due to the 
absence of a significant commitment of resources, the R type dry milling firm is least exposed to 
the uncertainties of this market. That is, in the absence of a significant investment in specialized 
processing assets (i.e. minimal investments in R&D in feedstock specific enzymes); the R type 
dry milling faces a relatively low cost of entry / exit whereby under conditions of uncertainty, an 
incorrect entry decision can be reversed at minimal cost. Furthermore, as R type’s lack of 
commitment to specialized assets leads to a smaller scale of operations, this smaller scale is 
suited to capitalizing on the nascent yet uncertain demands of this market.   
 
On the other hand, under stable market conditions, the K type cellulosic firm is favored over that 
of the R type dry milling firm because stable ethanol markets reduce the risk to K type’s 
specialized assets. In particular, since scale and processing efficiencies are dependent upon stable 
market conditions (Lambkin and Day 1989), limited disruptions in demand enable the K type 
cellulosic firm to not only exploit potential scale economies but also limits its exposure to the 
Ng and Goldsmith / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2010 
 
 2010 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
80
risk associated with their investments in R&D. These “uncertainty” dependent arguments are 
thus proposed by the following:  
 
Proposition (2):  Given differences in R and K type’s specialization of assets, entry-timing 
effects are uncertainty dependent whereby uncertain (stable) market conditions at founding 
favors the entrance of R (K) types. 
 
R and K type Entry Decision Making 
 
Differences in the specialization of assets by R and K types thereby yield a distinct trade-off 
between those gains from a commitment to specialized assets and the flexibility afforded by non-
specialized assets (e.g. Ebben and Johnson 2005); (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998); (Lieberman 
and Montgomery 1998); (Miller and Folta 2002). For instance, early commitments to specialized 
assets yield advantages from “exploiting” gains associated with efficiency. By committing to 
specialized assets, it promotes a firm’s ability to “exploit” or build upon its existing technical 
competence. Yet, such a commitment reduces a firm’s flexibility from “exploring” new market 
opportunities (Levinthal and March 1993). Exploration, nevertheless, has its costs because a firm 
fails to develop a distinct area of competence (March 1991). This study argues that this 
commitment (exploitation)-flexibility (exploration) trade-off not only drives an R and K type’s 
entry decisions, but subsequently determines the entry timing effects of density dependence and 
market uncertainty. 
 
To elaborate, an R type’s entry decision involves distinctly trading off gains from a commitment 
to exploit the efficiencies of specialized assets for the explorative benefits of flexible assets. 
Since the R type lacks a commitment to specialized resources, the R type - relative to the K type 
– has an inherent cost disadvantage. Yet, as the lack of specialized assets reduces a firm’s 
commitment to any particular set of assets, the R type benefits from being able to adapt and 
explore the changing opportunities of an emerging market. This is consistent with Zammuto 
(1988) who contends R types are adept at competing for first mover advantages, but fail to 
capitalize on efficiencies in leveraging a distinct area of expertise. This reasoning suggests that 
the early and rapid entry by dry milling firms in the 1990s was not due to efficiencies from the 
dry milling technology, but rather due to their low capital commitments. Stated differently, since 
dry milling involves a relatively low commitment of resources, this technology provided a low 
cost of entry as well as exit into this market. Yet, since the R type dry milling firm cannot 
compete on efficiency, this low cost of entry / exit, therefore, requires that the R type dry milling 
compete strictly on the first mover advantages of early entry. As a result of this trade-off, an R 
type dry milling firm enters early into the market in which markets are characterized by a low 
population and a high degree of uncertainty. This trade-off is proposed by the follow decision 
heuristic: 
 
Proposition (3): Driven by non-specialized assets, an R type’s early entry is the result of trading 
off its lack of production efficiencies for first mover advantages to which such a trade-off favors 
an R type’s early entry into low populated and uncertain markets.  
 
While, the K type firm’s entry decision emphasizes trading off the flexibility of non-specialized 
assets for its commitment to exploit the production efficiencies of its specialized assets. 
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However, since these production efficiencies involve an irreversible commitment of resources or 
at the minimum involve high entry and abandonment cost, this commitment to specialize limits 
K type’s flexibility from exploring the opportunities of emerging markets. Therefore, unlike the 
R type, the K type’s entry decision involves trading off the first mover advantages of non-
specialized assets for the gains in production efficiency that arise from a commitment to 
specialization. With this decision trade-off, this suggests the K type cellulosic firm distinctly 
favors late entrance for two reasons. First, as ethanol demand in maturing markets become well 
defined, late entry reduces the risk to K type’s investments in cellulosic. That is, such reductions 
in uncertainty provide justification for cellulosic firms to not only invest in costly R&D but also 
enable the K type to raise capital from external investors. Second, with relatively stable market 
conditions, output variations are minimized to which promotes the exploitation and thus 
specialization of tasks (e.g. Levinthal and March 1993). This enables the K type cellulosic firm 
to exploit its scale efficiencies and thus compete in high-density environments. This trade-off is 
proposed by the follow decision heuristic: 
 
Proposition (4): Driven by specialized assets, K type’s late entry decision is a result of trading 
off gains from first mover advantage for production efficiency rents to which such a trade-off 
favors a K type’s entry into highly populated and certain markets.  
 
R and K type Learning Effects 
 
A consequence of such decision heuristics is that an R and K types’ entry decisions distinctly 
affect their ability to exploit learning curve advantages. Since the R type competes through an 
early entry of the market, the R type dry milling firm thereby affords a “head start” in developing 
experiences that can reduce its cost. This head start yields learning curve advantages that can 
create a relative cost advantage to later entrants (Kerin et al. 1992); (Lieberman and Montgomery 
1998). This can be important for the R type dry milling firm because by leveraging such learning 
curve effects, the firm can compete with the scale efficiencies of the K type cellulosic firm. 
However, since the K type cellulosic firm has specialized assets, the K type should, thus, be 
better at exploiting such learning curve effects than the R type. This is because a firm’s 
specialization of experiences reinforces learning curve effects (Levinthal and March 1993); 
(March 1991). Hence, this suggests that since the cellulosic firm largely competes through their 
ability to exploit scale economies, learning curve effects should have a greater impact on the 
cellulosic firm’s performance than that of the dry milling firm. The following is proposed: 
 
Proposition (5): Given the specialization of assets of the R and K type, learning curve effects 
have a more pronounced effect on K type’s performance than the R type. 
 
Method 
 
To integrate the insights of the Resource Based View with Organizational Ecology, a dynamic 
programming (DP) simulation model was developed. DP models are suited to examining systems 
where there are a series or a sequence of decisions that are being made with respect to a number 
of changing state variables. Specifically, DP programming involves determining a sequence of 
optimal decisions that maximizes a given function for any given changes in future states of 
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nature (Kennedy 1986). DP also involves decisions that involve trade-offs in which there are 
explicit benefits and costs associated with each decision (Kennedy 1986). 
 
This study argues that a firm’s entry into the ethanol market exhibits these DP characteristics. As 
the product-life cycle evolves through various states of competition and uncertainty, the entry 
problem facing the manager is one of deciding over these changes in market states, a sequence of 
entry decisions that will maximize their firm’s profits. Moreover, since a DP approach is suited 
to examining trade-offs, such an approach is thereby suited to examining the firm’s commitment 
vs. flexibility trade-off (Ghemawat and Del Sol 1998). 
 
Formulating a DP Model 
 
DP involves deriving an optimal policy of interrelated optimal decisions that maximize an 
objective function over time. Founded on Bellman’s (1957) principle of optimality, an optimal 
policy “has the property that whatever the initial state decisions are, the remaining decisions 
must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the stage resulting from the first decision” 
(Bellman 1957: 83). Stated in mathematical terms, DP involves solving for a sequence of 
decisions or an optimal policy, {U1, U2, U3, ... UT-1} that maximizes a specified objective 
function, Vt (St, Ut), given a series of states (S1,S2,S3... St-1) for a finite period of t to T-1 
simulation periods (T = end of the product life cycle). Optimal decisions and state conditions are 
related through a state transformation function, St+1 (St, Ut), in which a current decision, Ut and 
state, St, impacts a future state, St+1 
 
To solve such a DP programming problem, backward induction is a commonly used algorithm 
(Kennedy 1986). Backward induction is a process of solving a sequence of optimal decisions by 
solving them backwards in time. Backward induction proceeds by first considering the decision 
being made in the last period and then choosing the optimal decision for the states associated 
with this period. Using the optimal decision made in this last period, one then determines the 
next optimal decision for the second-to-last period. This process continues backwards until the 
optimal decision has been determined for every possible state at every point in time. This 
backward induction algorithm is typically suited to solving problems with a finite time horizon 
and for problems involving discrete choice (i.e., enter or exit). Optimal solutions to such a 
problem are computed numerically.  
 
This backward induction algorithm is used to solve the bio energy firm’s (R and K types) 
optimal entry. This is because a bio energy firm’s entry decision is based on a discrete entry 
choice that occurs over various market states. Furthermore, since a firm’s decision to enter and 
remain within this bio energy sector is not indefinite, the entry decision is, thus, based on a finite 
planning horizon.  That is, a finite horizon was chosen because a manager’s planning horizon is 
typically based on returns over a finite period. Moreover, a finite horizon was chosen because 
optimal policy decisions are easier to compute and requires less computational resources.  
 
To illustrate the firm’s entry decision, equations 1 and 2 translate a firm’s entry behavior into a 
DP structure. A firm – such as an R or K type - for each time period, t, faces an entry or exit 
decision, Ut (1 = enter, 0 = not to enter / exit), that maximizes its profits, Vt (St, Ut) over t=0 to T-
1 simulation periods. For a given period t, a firm’s profits – equation 1– is comprised of gains 
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from early entry or first mover advantage (FMA), Xt (Ut), and gains from its production 
efficiencies, Pt (Ut , St). Since a firm’s specialized assets impacts a firm’s entry timing, a 
specialized asset parameter, SAt , is included into this profit equation. This specialized asset 
parameter, SAt, reflects a firm’s commitment to the ethanol industry. Larger values denote 
greater specificity and thus reflect a greater commitment to the industry than firms with less 
specialized assets. This characterization is also consistent with Ghemawat and Del Sols’ (1998) 
characterization of specialized assets. As the principle of optimality requires that future decisions 
must be optimal to earlier decisions, a firm’s profit must also include a one period future 
discounted profit value, Vt+1(St+1,Ut).  denotes a fixed discount rate.  
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The dynamic optimization of Equation 1 is constrained by a state transformation function, 
Equation 2. Given a firm’s  (1) entry / (0) exit decision, Ut , Equation 2 shows a firm’s one 
period future experience, St+1, is the sum of the firm’s accumulated experience, St , and its 
optimal decision, Ut, at period t.  Since a newly entering firm has no prior experience, its initial 
experience is equated to zero, S0=0 (e.g. Stinchcombe 1965).  
 
Innovation or FMA Rent: Xt (Ut) 
 
As entry decisions involve evaluating competing gains in FMA against gains in production 
efficiency, FMA, Xt (Ut), are the expected returns to a firm from bringing a new product or 
service to an emerging market (equation 3). The new product here is fuel ethanol. The expected 
returns are described by equation 3 whereby Prt (Nt-1), reflects the price of the ethanol produced 
by the firm. However, as witnessed in the ethanol market when there has been active investment 
and subsequent expansion of industry capacity, the price of ethanol declined1. In this study, we 
attribute this decline in price to increases in direct and indirect competition, Nt-1 (see also 
equation 8) in the ethanol market (Renewable Fuels Association 2008, 2009). Furthermore, W 
represents the expected returns from introducing ethanol to the market at time t = 0 (i.e. initial 
period of the simulation). As the gains from dry milling technologies are subject to obsolescence 
by newer technologies2, such as cellulosic, this expected return should thus decline with 
increasing market maturity. As a result, with increasing market maturity, t, returns, W, are 
modeled by a non-linear function that declines at an exponential rate, . The level of innovation 
rents or FMA returns secured by a firm is then derived by the product of a firm’s entry decision, 
Ut, (0 or 1) at time, t, price, Prt (Nt-1) and the declining value of the expected returns, W.  
      tttttt UWNUX   expPr)3( 1  
 
Gains from Production Efficiencies, Pt (Ut , St):   
 
                                                          
1 Alternatively, such declines in ethanol prices can be similarly observed by declines in the corn-ethanol spread. 
2 A reviewer correctly points out that our model is a stylized view of the industry.  Nobody knows for sure whether 
cellulosic technology will replace dry mill derived ethanol. One can surely imagine settings with excess corn with 
few market alternatives and poor infrastructure, e.g. Mato Grosso, Brazil (See Goldsmith et al. 2010), where low-
capital cost dry milling might be competitive.  
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Gains from production efficiencies, Pt (Ut , St) are returns from better utilizing the productive 
capacity of a firm’s specialized or non-specialized assets. A firm’s capacity utilization is 
determined by comparing the size of the market demand for ethanol, MSt , with the productive 
capacity, *tQ , of a firm’s assets (see also Kerin et al. 1992).  When the market demand or market 
size (MSt) exceeds the firm’s productive capacity, *tQ ,  the firm’s volume of output, tQ , is 
maximized at the level of its production capacity, *tQ . However, when market demand falls short 
of a firm’s production capacity, such as the initial stages of market development, the firm would 
not fully utilize its production capacity. The firm produces a level of ethanol output, tQ , that is 
determined by the current level of market demand, MSt. A firm’s volume of ethanol output, tQ , 
and production efficiencies are described by the following inequalities: 
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Market Size 
 
The market demand or market size of ethanol, MSt , is expressed as the product of a market 
growth parameter, s,  and a time trend variable, t  (Equation 5). To capture mature market 
conditions, this growth in demand has an upper limit of M . This upper limit can be interpreted 
as the “ethanol-blend wall” in which a maximum 10% ethanol-fuel blend is currently permitted 
by law.   MtsMinMSt ,)5( 3   
In addition, as markets mature, the demand for ethanol should become increasingly stable or 
certain. Market size, MSt*, is, thus, adjusted by a market uncertainty function, UNCt.  
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Market uncertainty, tUNC , is driven by a random number generator, RND, with values that 
range between -1 and 0. Negative values were used to capture the downside risk that can arise 
from entry into the ethanol market. This downside risk is used to capture the uncertainties about 
the continued viability of the ethanol market. However, as markets mature, this uncertainty 
declines. Uncertainty in the demand for ethanol is, therefore, modeled as a declining function of 
market maturity, t.  This decline in market uncertainty is consistent with Organizational Ecology 
depictions of the product life cycle (Lambkin and Day 1989). To model this uncertainty, it is 
multiplied by the second term, 

 
T
t1 . By taking the product of market size, MSt (equation 5) 
with this uncertainty parameter, tUNC , it generates an increasing trend in market size with 
reductions in downside variability. To examine the effects of such market uncertainty on an R 
and K type firms’ entry timing, this equation is adjusted by a scalar parameter, v. 
 
Density Dependence 
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Density dependence effects are captured by the Lotka-Voltera population growth function 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989) (equation 7) 
  
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The market’s population, Nt+1 , of ethanol firms in period t+1, grows at an intrinsic population 
growth rate of,  .  The intrinsic population growth rate of, , refers to the rate of new ethanol 
firms entering the market. This growth rate was set at a rate of 0.5 units / simulation time to 
reflect highly but not purely competitive markets3. Entry is also limited by the market’s carrying 
capacity parameter, .  The carrying capacity parameter, , refers to the maximum population of 
firms that can be supported by the market. Through the population dynamics expressed in 
equation 7, density dependence effects are captured through downward pressures on price. 
Specifically through equation 8, increases in population from equation 7 reduces the firm’s 
product price, Prt (Nt-1), by an exponential rate of μ from an initial price of Pr0 + Pr1 to an 
asymptotic terminal price level of Pr0. In particular, as a firm cannot influence the entry 
decisions of others, an individual firm, thereby, cannot influence population and thus price. 
Equation 8, thereby, assumes that ethanol firms have very limited market power.  
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R and K Type Learning 
 
Learning curve effects are captured by equation 9 which models a declining relationship between 
a firm’s Marginal Cost, )( tt SMC , and a firm’s accumulated experience, St . An ethanol firm’s 
accumulated experiences, St, reduces its marginal cost,  tt SMC , at a learning rate of  from an 
initial value of ρ +  to an asymptotic marginal cost value of ρ that is strictly positive.  The initial 
value ρ +  corresponds to the marginal cost of a firm with zero experience (St =0). This reflects 
the high costs associated with “liabilities of newness” (e.g. Stinchcombe 1965). As the firm 
accumulates greater experiences, St, its marginal cost declines to an asymptotic marginal cost 
value of ρ.  
    tStSMC   exp)9(  
 
Based on the entry order effects of population density, market uncertainty, and learning, a firm’s 
returns from its production efficiencies is represented in full by equation 10. These returns are 
computed as the product of a firm’s price, Prt (Nt-1), its level of sales tQ , – as determined by 
inequality 5 – and its entry decision, Ut , less the sum of the product of its marginal cost,  tt SMC  and its fixed level of production capacity, *tQ  and its entry decision, Ut. and the product 
of its Fixed cost and entry decision, Ut.  A fixed cost parameter was used to account for startup 
                                                          
3 Under perfectly competitive conditions, free entry / exit would suggest a greater rate of entry, such as a value 
greater or equal to 1. However, since R type dry milling firms requires a minimum amount of investment, there are 
some positive entry and exit costs. Hence, a value of less than one was set.    
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and shut down costs. That is, in addition to our specialized asset parameter, SAt , this Fixed Cost, 
parameter was included to reflect the cost of entry and exit to the industry4. 
         ttttttttttt UFCQSMCUQNSUP   *1Pr,)10(  
 
To include, a firm’s FMA rents, Xt (Ut), the full specification of a firm’s profits is shown by the 
following. 
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In drawing on equations 11 and 2, the R and K type firm is distinguished by differences in their 
specialized asset parameter, SAt, as well as differences in Fixed Costs. In parameterizing these 
firms, the R type has a lower value for this specialized asset parameter, SAt, than the K type. 
Furthermore, since the R type dry milling firm procures corn as a key input to their ethanol 
process, the R type dry milling firm faces a higher marginal cost, MC, than the K type cellulosic 
firm. Furthermore, since the R type dry milling firm has access to relatively smaller volumes of 
feedstock (i.e. corn) than the K type cellulosic firm (i.e. agricultural waste, wood chips, etc), the 
R type dry milling firm has a lower fixed productive capacity, *tQ , than the K type cellulosic 
firm.  Critical will be whether the K-Type firm, with its higher capital cost, can balance its need 
for large scale processing with a well-matched feedstock collection model with high spatial 
density.  Moreover, since the R type dry milling firm has fewer specialized assets (i.e. lack of 
R&D and lack of other supporting assets in transportation and distribution), the R type dry 
milling firm has a lower Fixed Cost, FC, than the K type cellulosic firm.  
 
Model Validation 
 
Validation of simulation models, amongst other factors, depends on the desired objectives of the 
research (Sargent 1999). Although simulations have varied uses, simulations have been used in 
management research as a means for theory development (e.g. Cyert and March 1963); (Nelson 
and Winter 1982). For instance, in studies of firm and market evolution, Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) seminal work had drew on simulation modeling to examine the dynamic behavior of 
firms and markets. This study follows a similar approach in which the DP simulation is used to 
examine the theoretical validity of this paper. As a result, the focus of this study is not one of 
validating the empirical results of the DP simulation, but rather the DP simulation is used to 
examine the logical consistency of this study’s theoretical arguments. This is not to say that 
empirical validation is not important but this paper argues that the “empirical validation” of 
simulation results raises some methodological concerns.  
 
For instance, one common method for validating simulation results is the “historical friendly” 
approach (Sargent 1999). This involves comparing the outputs of the simulation with a detailed 
                                                          
4 For instance, since cellulosic firms require investments in R&D, such commitments, however, occur over multiple 
periods. These R&D investments are, thus, treated as fixed costs that accrue over time.  
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history of the economic system (Sargent 1999); (Windrum et al. 2007). For this study, a 
historically friendly approach is, however, problematic. This is because although key market 
concepts such as competition and uncertainty can be empirically measured, a key focus of this 
research is on the examination of the entry behaviors of the R and K type firms. Yet, with the 
possible exception of Goldsmith and Dissart (1998), there have been very limited empirical 
estimates of R and K type organizations in agribusiness research. In fact, to our knowledge, there 
have been no empirical estimates of R and K bio energy firms. As a result, even though other 
estimates relating to population (i.e. firm entries) and uncertainty could be drawn from prior 
studies, estimates of the parameters of the R and K type firm are not available. Validation, 
especially through comparisons with past studies, thereby, becomes difficult because there is no 
prior basis for comparison. The estimation of these key parameters is, thus, called for in future 
studies.  
 
Furthermore, a “historical” approach also faces some deep seated methodological problems. A 
historical approach only shows that the underlying model is “capable” of producing the observed 
empirical phenomena because multiple combinations of parameter settings, initial conditions, 
and structural assumptions can lead to the same simulated output (Windrum et al. 2007).  
Nevertheless, although there are numerous possible parameter settings, the logic of our 
conceptual model dictates that the entry behaviors of R and K types can be still examined by 
relative differences in their firm level parameters, such as asset specificity, MC, Output, Fixed 
Costs. These parameter settings are shown in Appendix 1. Based on these settings, this study’s 
DP simulation model was programmed with the Fortran 77 compiler. Based on this code, various 
simulation runs with randomized initial values were also conducted. The findings were robust 
across these simulations. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Density Dependence  
 
To examine Proposition 1, the initial population conditions were varied to examine the effect of 
population densities on R and K types’ entrance.  In addition, since initial population densities 
impact the population densities of later periods, such variations in the initial population impact 
the population densities confronted by the later entrant, K type. The carrying capacity of this 
market is artificially limited to 100 competitors. Similar entry patterns were observed with 
increases in this carrying capacity.  Lastly, since density effects are reflected through reductions 
in price, the price is reduced at a rate of -0.05 per unit increase in the population. Changes in this 
parameter did not appreciable affect R and K types’ pattern of entry.  
  
Given these specifications, increases in population densities prompted earlier exit by the R type 
and reduced R type’s profits (Table 2). For instance, at a population density of 2 other 
competitors, R types entered in the first period and exited in period 4 with profits of $257. 
However, with increasing densities (e.g. initial population = 20), the R type exited in period 2 
with a significant reduction in profits to $15. With further increases in population density of 25 
other competitors, R types no longer entered the market. While, K type’s entry and exit periods 
remained largely robust to these changes in population. In fact, by increasing the initial 
population density to the market’s carrying capacity (100 competitors), the K type still remained 
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in the market (entry in period 8 and exited in period 15). However, K type’s profits dramatically 
declined from $89,697 to $107. Nevertheless, the K type was more resilient to increases in 
population densities than the R type. This is consistent with Proposition 1. 
 
One implication of these results is that density conditions at founding have differential effects on 
the survival of R and K type firms. This suggests that as competition increases, dry mill firms are 
not likely to enter the industry and are likely to be displaced by the efficiencies of the cellulosic 
firm. This result appears to be consistent with the view that cellulosic is a more efficient source  
 
Table 2. Density Dependence 
 R Type K Type 
Initial Population Entry Exit Fitness Entry   Exit     Fitness 
2 1 4 257.4 7 No Exit 89697.3 
3 1 3 221 7 No Exit 46004.5 
4 1 3 192.2 8 No Exit 23141 
5 1 3 165.5 8 No Exit 16824.8 
10 1 2 87.1 8 No Exit 4579.6 
15 1 2 46.8 8 No Exit 2115.1 
20 1 2 15.4 8 No Exit 1229 
25 No Entry No Entry 0 8 No Exit 810.9 
50 No Entry No Entry 0 8 No Exit 241.4 
75 No Entry No Entry 0 8 No Exit 138.3 
100 No Entry No Entry 0 8 No Exit 107.1 
 
of ethanol than dry milling (e.g. Robertson et al. 2000)5. In particular, this result is consistent 
with some of the realities faced by dry milling firms. For instance, the increasing competition 
among dry milling firms has lead to an increase in the input price of corn which resulted in a 
decline in the price margins for dry millers. This reflects a decline in market opportunities to 
which favor more efficient conversion technologies. Hence, under highly dense population 
conditions, the K type cellulosic firms maybe favored for their efficiencies in gaining access to 
low cost feedstock. This lower cost of cellulosic feedstock not only lowers K type’s input costs 
but also provides significant scale efficiencies for the K type cellulosic firm (Lin and Tanaka, 
2006). However, such scale economies depend on the firm’s ability commercially employ 
effective cellulosic enzymes (e.g. Knauf and Moniruzzaman 2004); (Tiffany and Eidman 2004); 
(Rendleman and Shapouri 2007).  
 
Market Volatility 
 
To examine Proposition 2, market uncertainty was varied from a value of v = 1 (low uncertainty) 
to a value of v = 10 (high uncertainty)6. When uncertainty was low (v = 1), the R type firm 
entered in period 1 and exited in period 9 with profits  of $1,926 and the K type entered in period 
7 and remained until period 15 with profits of $934,870 (Table 3).  With increases in uncertainty 
(v = 10), the R type still enters in period 1, but exits in period 3 and its profits are reduced by 
61% to $754.  K type’s entry was significantly delayed to period 13 and its profits fell by 56% to 
$414,723. This pattern of entry is consistent with Proposition 2.  
                                                          
5 This a point that is not only raised by a reviewer but also is commonly understood by those involved in comparing 
the advantages between these energy conversion technologies (e.g. Robertson et al., 2000).  
6 Population effects are removed by setting the price decline parameter to 0. 
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The implication of these results is that the uncertainties in ethanol demand favor the entry of the 
dry milling firm, while delaying the entry of the cellulosic firm. Hence, unlike RBV explanations 
(e.g. Ghemawat and Del. Sol 1998), this suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, the R type 
dry milling firm’s lack of specialized assets may promote earlier entrance or at the minimum 
reduces R type’s exposure to risk than when compared to the K type. This appears to be 
consistent with the pattern of entry in the ethanol industry.  
 
This result also has related implications to U.S. energy policy.  Uncertainty declines when 
commitment to ethanol tax credits, import tariffs, and subsidies are strengthened. With 
reductions in uncertainty, greater specialized investments can be made.  For instance, ADM who 
has long experienced with dry and wet milling technologies (ADM News release, 2007), and 
British Petroleum, long experienced in fossil fuel technologies, both have expanded, albeit 
slowly, into cellulosic ethanol production research and development.   
 
Table 3. Market Uncertainty 
 R Type K Type 
Uncertainty, V* Entry Exit   Fitness     Entry   Exit    Fitness 
1 1 9 1926.2 7 No Exit 934870.3 
2 1 4 1466.7 7 No Exit 922611.1 
3 1 3 880.7 7 No Exit 801919.4 
4 1 3 754 7 No Exit 674460.6 
5 1 3 754 11 No Exit 642550.8 
6 1 3 754 11 No Exit 567595.2 
7 1 3 754 12 No Exit 435335 
8 1 3 754 13 No Exit 414723 
9 1 3 754 13 No Exit 414723 
10       
 
Joint Density and Volatility Effects  
 
In order to evaluate Propositions 3 and 4, density dependence and market uncertainty effects 
were jointly examined7 (Table 4). Under conditions of low (2) density and highly uncertain 
market conditions, the R type firm enters in period 1 and exits in period 3 with profits of $2.6. R 
type’s entry behavior is, thus, consistent with the conditions described by Proposition 3. 
Furthermore, as indicated by Proposition 3, R type’s competition for first mover advantage 
(FMA) rents in periods 1 and 2 yields respective gains of $320 and $214. These FMA rents are, 
however, offset by respective losses in production efficiency of $-450 and $-72. This trade-off is 
consistent with Proposition 3.  
 
The K type firm enters in period 7 and remains until period 15 with profits of $219,6908  
(Table 4).  The K type enters into the market with a population of 20 other competing firms and 
in a market with reduced uncertainty.  K type’s entry into such founding conditions is, thus, 
                                                          
7 To provide a suitable balance of population density effects and market uncertainty, the price decline parameter was 
set to -0.025, and the market uncertainty parameter, v, was set to a value of 2.5. Through comparisons with other 
combination of values, we felt that this set of values yields the greatest balance of these effects.  
8 Profits is calculated through equation 11 in which fitness is determined by the sum of the period’s innovation rents 
and production efficiency rents and the one period discounted value of the one period future fitness. 
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consistent with Proposition 4. Furthermore, K type’s entry into such founding conditions was 
attributed to K type’s decision to compete for production efficiency rents. For instance, in period 
7, K type’s production efficiency rents are $42,291, while its FMA rents are only $29. For the 
remaining periods, the average production efficiency and FMA rents were, respectively, $29,889 
and $10.  
 
 
Table 4. Density Dependence and Market Uncertainty 
 R Type K Type 
Time Population Entry 1 Fitness Innovation  Production Entry 1 Fitness Innovation Production 
  Exit 0  Rents  Efficiency Exit 0  Rents Efficiency 
1 2 1 2.6 320.1 -450 0 0 0 0 
2 3 1 143.1 214.6 -71.5 0 0 0 0 
3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 9.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 13.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 19.9 0 0 0 0 1 219690 29 42291 
8 27.9 0 0 0 0 1 191560 19.5 59369.2 
9 38 0 0 0 0 1 142745 13 49122.4 
10 49.7 0 0 0 0 1 101098 8.7 19793.9 
11 62.2 0 0 0 0 1 87799.2 5.9 30641.2 
12 74 0 0 0 0 1 61724.3 3.9 22587.3 
13 83.6 0 0 0 0 1 42263.7 2.6 17544.8 
14 90.5 0 0 0 0 1 26693.5 1.8 14626.4 
15 94.8 0 0 0 0 1 13030.6 1.2 13029.4 
 
R and K type Learning 
This simulation draws on the parameters of the previous simulation with the exception that 
learning curve effects are enabled (Table 5). The R and K types’ learning rates were both set at a 
value of -0.4 (i.e.  r =  k= -0.4). Such a rate is set so that the effects of each firm’s non-
specialized or specialized assets can be independently examined of this learning rate. The R type 
firm enters in period 1 and exits in period 3, while the K type enters in period 7 and remains until 
period 15 (Table 5). Relative to the results of the previous simulation (Table 4), learning does not 
alter R and K type entry and exit periods. However, learning significantly improves both R and 
K type’s profits. In particular, R type’s profits improved more dramatically than the K type. R 
type’s profits increased by 2350% from $2.6 to $63.7, while K type’s profits improved by 47% 
from $219,690 to $323,352.  
 
Table 5. Density Dependence and Market Uncertainty with Learning 
Learning R Type K Type  Learning rate = -0.4 
Rate Entry Exit  Fitness Entry        Exit Fitness 
0.1 1 3 20.2 7 No Exit 323351.9 
0.2 1 3 36.2 7 No Exit 323351.9 
0.3 1 3 50.6 7 No Exit 323351.9 
0.4 1 3 63.7 7 No Exit 323351.9 
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The learning rate was then varied to determine the robustness of these findings (Table 5). R 
type’s profits were examined with learning rates that ranged from -0.1 to -0.4. Lower rates of 
learning were used to reflect R type’s lack of specialized assets.  However, even with such lower 
learning rates, the R type firm still experienced a larger percentage growth in profits than the K 
type9. Proposition 5 is, therefore, not supported. This suggests early entry by the R type dry 
milling firm can benefit from learning curve economies. For instance, ADM, which has utilized 
both dry and wet milling processes, has been an early entrant into the corn-ethanol industry and 
remains as one of the lowest cost processors of corn ethanol. 
 
The broader implication of this result is that it suggests learning curve effects may significantly 
affect an R type dry milling firm’s ability to compete with the efficiencies of the K type 
cellulosic firm. Namely, although the high R&D costs of cellulosic remains a key commercial 
barrier, cellulosic firms nevertheless face lower feedstock costs than dry millers.  Yet, despite 
such cost advantages, early entry by the R type dry milling firm can leverage learning curve 
effects from being first movers to offset their higher input corn costs, and will compete 
aggressively against later entering cellulosic firms. Learning curve economies may in part 
explain the viability and logic of the dry mill corn model in the early phase on the bio energy 
movement.  
 
However, shifts in U.S. energy policy can reduce the high costs of producing effective cellulosic 
enzymes.  For instance, expansion of tax credits and subsidies to the cellulosic ethanol sector 
could overcome the high R&D costs of enzyme research and development. Specifically, shifts in 
U.S. energy policy towards investments in R&D as opposed to fuel would benefit the cellulosic 
industry. Such a policy shift would reduce uncertainty and allow K types to further commit to its 
specialized assets and exploit the scale efficiencies of specialization. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Amidst rapid technological changes and shifting competing landscapes, understanding when and 
how firms enter into the bio energy market can be instrumental to a firm’s competitive survival. 
Although there are various considerations that affect a firm’s entry timing, the insights of the 
RBV and Organizational Ecology can be particularly instructive to explaining a firm’s entry into 
the ethanol market. In drawing on these approaches, a central tenet of this study is that a firm’s 
entry timing is dependent on the specialization of their assets to which such specializations 
introduce a “commitment-flexibility” trade-off that influences a firm’s entry into distinct stages 
of the product market life cycle. This basic argument offers four implications and contributions.  
First of significant importance is this study’s unique application of density dependence theory to 
the entry of bio energy firms.  As the government has multiple objectives in supporting bio 
energy incubation, public technologies and ethanol subsidies, such objectives can lead to a more 
dense population, which in turn will affect the capital commitment-flexibility calculus facing bio 
energy managers and investors. This study shows that entry into the bio energy market can be 
density dependent in which the R type dry milling firm may be better able to survive in relatively 
low population conditions than K type cellulosic operations. While, under highly dense 
environments, the K type cellulosic firm is more likely to enter than the R type dry milling firm. 
As such density dependence effects can influence the composition of bio energy firms in the 
                                                          
9 Results are available on request. 
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market, determining the “optimal” composition of bio energy firms is important. This is because 
the growth of the bio energy market requires not only innovations by cellulosic firms, but must 
also be commercially viable (i.e. dry milling). Policies that focus on the development of one (i.e. 
ethanol subsidies to dry milling) may lead to population conditions that drive out the entry of the 
other (i.e. cellulosic). Since cellulosic reflects a potentially important technology that can 
significantly reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil as well as being more environmentally 
friendly, such density dependence explanations should, therefore, be considered.  
 
Second, as bio energy entry decisions involve a basic “commitment-flexibility trade-off”, such a 
decision framework can help bio energy managers and investors better understand the trade-offs 
between that of being a cost efficient processor of cellulosic biomass and that of being an early 
mover to the uncertainties of an emerging market. The tradeoff problem for managers and 
investors also in part explains why new technologies, such as cellulosic, often are by-passed in 
favor of older or “lesser” technologies, such as dry milling. Understanding such a trade-off not 
only introduces to bio energy managers and investors the distinct rent streams associated with 
such activities, but understanding such a trade-off can extend more traditional capital budgeting 
approaches, such as Net Present Value (NPV). In particular, NPV methods have been used to 
examine the long term profitability of market entry decisions (Briggeman et al. 2006). However, 
NPV approaches do not account for this commitment-flexibility trade-off nor account for 
changes in investment value that can arise from different states of nature. The study’s DP 
approach allows bio energy managers and investors to examine such trade-offs in a dynamic 
context.  
 
Third, from a broader research standpoint, agribusiness and agricultural economists have 
traditionally drawn on the concept of specialized assets or asset specificity to explain the vertical 
coordination of markets (e.g. Barry, 1999); (Barry et al. 1992); (Cook and Barry 2004). This 
study extends the concept of specialized assets to not only explain a bio energy firm’s 
commitment-flexibility trade-off, but also their entry timing. This linking of a firm’s specialized 
asset / asset specificity to such a trade-off has not been recognized by the Resource Based View 
or by Organizational Ecology explanations of market entry. The significance of this linkage is 
that this study provides a greater understanding of how specialized assets impact a firm’s internal 
decision processes to which have been absent in both these perspectives.  
 
Lastly, this study suggests entry strategies need to jointly account for a firm’s specialized assets 
with the contingencies of the market environment (i.e. population and uncertainty). Although the 
RBV has been one of the key influences to the field of strategic management, the RBV has, 
nevertheless, been criticized for its lack of attention to market conditions (e.g. Priem and Butler 
2001). This study extends RBV explanations of entry timing by attributing entry to both the 
specialized nature of a firm’s assets as well as to the uncertain and population conditions of the 
market. Such an extension argues that firms with specialized assets will favor late as opposed to 
early entrance. A delayed entry not only leverages greater  market certainty and thus reducing 
risks to a firm’s specialized asset, but late entry enables the firm to benefit from the efficiencies 
of its specialized assets. Such an argument offers one explanation of the entry behaviors of bio 
energy firms.  
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On a related note, this explanation also extends more traditional “barrier to entry” explanations. 
Namely, as barriers to entry stem from exploiting scale economies, it typically involves 
investments in specialized or dedicated production assets. Hence, Industrial Organizational 
economic explanations would suggest first mover advantages can arise in the presence of such 
barriers to entry. Yet, as firms with specialized assets favor late as oppose to early entrance, this 
specialized asset argument is, thus, not accounted for in barriers to entry explanations.  
 
There are nevertheless theoretical and methodological limitations to our study. Theoretically, 
Organizational Ecology contends “organizational inertia” limits a firm’s ability to change. This 
is also consistent with RBV reasoning (Priem and Butler 2001). As there has been greater 
attention to examining organizational change processes (e.g. Ng 2007), changes in a firm’s asset 
profiles can subsequently alter their entry behavior. Thus examination of such change processes 
is called for in future research.  
 
Another limitation of this study is the DP simulation was constructed for the primary purpose of 
theory building. Our DP simulation results can only be interpreted as an extension to the logic of 
our theoretical arguments. A direction for future research is therefore to empirically test the 
arguments of this model. Lastly, our DP model is based on entry decisions involving discrete 
entry / exit choices and is based on a finite planning horizon. A limitation of a finite planning 
horizon is that political interests (i.e. job creation and perceived energy independence) may favor 
a long term government commitment to U.S. corn-ethanol. In this context, an infinite planning 
horizon may be a more appropriate representation of the DP model. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Market Selection Parameters 
Parameter Name Parameter description Assigned Value 
 Intrinsic growth rate of pop. 0.5/unit time 
   Carrying capacity of environment 100 firms 
N1 Initial population levels at period 1. 2 firms 
N15 Max population levels in period 15. 100 firms   Rate of decline in prices -0.05 /unit time 
Pr0 Terminal industry price at high 
population densities. 
MCK (St) (MC for K type) 
Pr1 Potential price reduction associated 
with competitive markets. 
MCR (St)-MCK (St) (Differential MC 
between R type and K types.) 
 
Market Selection Parameters 
Parameter Name Parameter description Assigned Value 
 Intrinsic growth rate of pop. 0.5/unit time 
   Carrying capacity of environment 100 firms 
N1 Initial population levels at period 1. 2 firms 
N15 Max population levels in period 15. 100 firms   Rate of decline in prices -0.05 /unit time 
Pr0 Terminal industry price at high 
population densities. 
MCK (St) (MC for K type) 
Pr1 Potential price reduction associated 
with competitive markets. 
MCR (St)-MCK (St) (Differential MC 
between R type and K types.) 
 
Firm Asset Specificity Parameters 
Parameter Name Parameter Description Assigned Value   Organizational learning rate for both 
R- and K- types 
 =0.0 (simulation one) 
Β Discount rate on objective value 
function 
8% 
ρr  (for R type) Asymptotic marginal cost level. 20/unit 
 
φr (for R type) Potential reductions in marginal cost 20/unit 
 
Firm Asset Specificity Parameters 
Strategy Type Marginal Cost  
MC(St ) (Constant) 
Fixed Cost 
FC (Constant) 
Firm productive output 
U.P (Constant) 
R-Type 40/unit 50 10 units 
K-Type 10/unit 1000 5000 units 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ng and Goldsmith / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2010 
 
 2010 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
100
 
